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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS                         
ABOUT OFFICER IMMUNITY 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION 
 
If there is a single foundational assumption in conventional thinking 
about official immunity doctrines, it is that “[t]he resolution of immunity 
questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any 
available alternative.”1  On the one hand, it is thought, it would be costly 
and unfair to hold officials liable out of their own pockets whenever they 
make erroneous constitutional judgments.2  On the other hand, to deny 
redress to victims of constitutional violations is not only unfair to them,3 
but also diminishes the significance of constitutional rights more broadly by 
undermining incentives for officials to stay within constitutional bounds.4
My first goal in this Essay will be to refute the assumption that official 
immunity doctrine necessarily requires a balance of evils.  Although it is 
undoubtedly true (indeed, almost tautologically so) that official immunity 
reduces the value of rights, analysis goes wrong at the outset if it assumes 
that the substantive content of constitutional guarantees and the availability 
of causes of action to enforce them are fixed, and only then asks whether 
official immunity should exist as a regrettably necessary expedient.  As 
Professor John Jeffries has observed, official immunity is not a variable 
among constants but, instead, is one potential variable among others.
 
5
 
*  Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Dan Meltzer 
and Peter Schuck for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Alexander 
Dryer, Mark Savignac, and Previn Warren for outstanding research assistance.  In case my 
views might have been influenced in any way, I should disclose that, during the period in 
which I wrote this Article, I was representing a plaintiff in a constitutional tort action who 
was seeking to overcome an official immunity defense. 
  
  1.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982); see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies 
and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (characterizing the law of remedies as “a 
jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost between declaring a right and implementing a 
remedy”). 
  2.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806, 813–14; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239–40 
(1974);  cf.  PETER  H.  SCHUCK,  SUING  GOVERNMENT:  CITIZEN  REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL 
WRONGS 98–99 (1983). 
  3.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
  4.  See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity 
Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 630–31; Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional 
Damages and Corrective Justice:  A Different View,  76  VA.  L.  REV.  997, 1019 (1990) 
(criticizing the argument that victims should not be compensated for all foreseeable damages 
caused by unconstitutional conduct). 
  5.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE 
L.J. 87, 99–100 (1999). 480  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
According to him, in the absence of official immunity doctrines, courts 
might prove more hesitant to expand the scope of constitutional rights.6  
Although Jeffries seems indubitably right about this point, the insight that 
official immunity is a variable among variables has further-reaching 
implications than even he has recognized.  In the absence of official 
immunity, even some currently well-established constitutional rights and 
authorizations to sue to enforce them would likely shrink, and sometimes 
appropriately so.7
This reflection both leads to and helps corroborate a broader insight 
about the relationship among constitutional rights, causes of action to 
enforce such rights, justiciability doctrines, official immunity, and various 
rules of pleading and proof that I call the doctrinal Equilibration Thesis.
 
8  
According to the Equilibration Thesis, substantive rights, causes of action 
to enforce rights, rules of pleading and proof, and immunity doctrines all 
are flexible and potentially adjustable components of a package of rights 
and enforcement mechanisms that should be viewed, and assessed for 
desirability, as a whole.9
Viewing immunity doctrine as a potential variable among variables 
frames a question that should occupy the forefront of debates about official 
immunity:  what are the distinctive features of official immunity that might 
make it well or poorly adapted—in comparison with other potentially 
adjustable variables—for achieving an optimal bundle of rights and 
surrounding jurisdictional and related doctrines?  My second goal in this 
Essay is to make progress toward answering this question.  In comparison 
with adjustments of rights and many causes of action, official immunity 
doctrine is trans-substantive.  Where recognized, it applies equally to suits 
to enforce the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Equal 
Protection Clause, and every other justiciable provision of the Constitution.  
Immunity’s trans-substantive character makes it a relatively crude tool for 
defining or redefining packages of rights and enforcement mechanisms that 
confer meaningful guarantees but are not intolerably costly. 
  If the Equilibration Thesis is correct, it falsifies 
the assumption that official immunity is at best a distasteful necessity.   
Instead, the Equilibration Thesis casts official immunity as a potential 
mechanism for achieving the best overall bundle of rights and 
correspondingly calibrated remedies within our constitutional system. 
Despite its trans-substantivity, official immunity doctrine is not, of 
course, wholly inflexible.  We can, and do, have different levels of 
immunity, which can extend to officials performing different functions.  It 
is also possible for different immunity rules to apply to suits for damages, 
on the one hand, and suits for injunctions, on the other.  In thinking about 
the roles that official immunity can play in achieving desirable alignments 
 
  6.  See id. at 98–100. 
  7.  See id. at 104–05 (appearing to treat rights as fixed and unchangeable once they have 
been clearly established, despite the social costs of official and enterprise liability). 
  8.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And 
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 639 (2006). 
  9.  See id. at 690–91. 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   481 
of substantive rights and mechanisms for enforcing them, we should 
therefore attend more closely to the purposes that adjustments along these 
dimensions might serve.  At the same time, we should consider whether 
alterations of other elements of overall packages of substantive rights, 
causes of action, justiciability doctrines, and rules of pleading and proof 
might better promote the same goals that current law relies on official 
immunity to achieve. 
My third goal in this Essay is to reconsider the question of how well the 
traditional justifications for official immunity doctrines stand up once 
official immunity is seen as one potential variable among others and its 
distinctive features as a mechanism for doctrinal equilibration lie exposed.  
My discussion of this question will be tentative, partly because many 
potentially fruitful comparisons remain unexplored in the literature and 
partly because much hinges on empirical questions that lack obvious 
answers.  I shall, however, highlight some items that belong on the agenda 
for scholarly research. 
My sharpest conclusion, overall, is that thinking about official immunity 
ought to start largely afresh, with a  willingness to follow analysis and 
evidence where they lead.  On one side of the debate as conventionally 
framed, critics who believe that immunity only cheapens rights and want to 
abolish it should think more carefully about what the consequences of 
abolishing immunity might be.  If deprived of official immunity as an 
equilibrating mechanism, the U.S.  Supreme Court might give us more 
narrowly defined rights or fewer causes of action for constitutional 
violations.  On the other side of the debate, defenders of current doctrines 
ought to recognize that immunity doctrine, as currently framed, rests on a 
number of shaky assumptions.  Immunity is a means, not an end, and there 
has been too little thinking about whether there might be better tools for 
achieving the same purposes.  In this state of affairs, I shall advance more 
questions than answers, but with confidence that framing the right questions 
can be the first, crucial step down the path to enhanced understanding and 
ultimately, one hopes, to better law. 
I.  THE EQUILIBRATION THESIS 
Discussions of official immunity too often begin within an artificially 
constricted frame.  If we ask whether or when officials should have 
immunity from suit, we characteristically assume all of the following 
things:  (1) the substantive content of constitutional rights is fixed; (2) the 
applicable law creates a cause of action for damages or injunctions as a 
mechanism for remedying rights violations; and (3) the party suing an 
official has standing and otherwise presents a justiciable lawsuit.10
 
  10.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1820–24 (1991). 
  We 
typically also assume that (4) the government cannot be sued for the 
constitutional violations committed by its officials, or at least that a suit 
against the government would not provide full compensation for a 482  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
constitutional wrong.11
This mode of analysis is shallow and artificial.  In an earlier article, I 
advanced what I called the Equilibration Thesis to explain the relationship 
among doctrines defining substantive rights, authorizing causes of action, 
regulating the justiciability of claims, and governing judicial remedies.
  If the government could be sued for the full costs 
resulting from constitutional violations, plaintiffs would have no incentive 
to sue the officials too.  Only against the background of these assumptions 
do we conventionally address the desirability of  official immunity or 
consider it as a variable. 
12  
As noted above, the Equilibration Thesis holds that courts charged with 
implementing constitutional rights or values sometimes view justiciability 
doctrines, merits doctrines, and remedial doctrines as an integrated unit.13
Several assumptions underlie the Equilibration Thesis.  First, many and 
possibly most constitutional rights are not clear and determinate Platonic 
essences.
  
Confronted with a situation in which they believe that the values underlying 
constitutional rights are not adequately realized in practice, courts might 
take any or all of the steps of expanding the definition of rights, expanding 
the causes of action available to enforce rights, expanding standing, or 
relaxing barriers to equitable or damages remedies.  Conversely, when 
courts regard the social costs of the existing bundle of rights and 
enforcement mechanisms as excessive, they might consider calibrating 
adjustments in any of the components of the package. 
14
 
  11.  Both the federal government and the states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, 
except to the extent that they may choose to waive it. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. 
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841, 878 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].  
Although local governments do not possess sovereign immunity, see id. at 885, they are not 
liable for their officials’ torts on a respondeat superior basis, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7, 691–94 (1978).  Under cases decided subsequent to Monell, 
the standards for establishing the liability of local governmental entities for constitutional 
violations committed by their officials are exceedingly difficult to satisfy. See  HART  & 
WECHSLER, supra, at 960–63 (summarizing Supreme Court decisions applying Monell). 
  Rather, rights reflect values or interests, the sensible pursuit or 
  12.  See Fallon, supra note 8, at 637. 
  13.  See id.  The Equilibration Thesis is in substantial part a synthesis of work done by 
others.  A number of scholars have argued persuasively that views about the merits influence 
judicial determinations of justiciability. See, e.g.,  William A. Fletcher, The Structure of 
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (arguing that standing should be understood as “a 
question on the merits of plaintiff’s claim”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the 
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1474–75 (1998).  Other scholars have 
established that considerations involving acceptable remedies influence judicial 
determinations of which rights to recognize and how to define them. See, e.g., SCHUCK, 
supra note 2, at 25–28, 186; Gewirtz, supra  note  1, at 678–79; Daryl Levinson, Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,  99  COLUM.  L.  REV.  857, 889–99 (1999).  My 
earlier article demonstrated an additional linkage between concerns about acceptable 
remedies and determinations of justiciability. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 648–83.  Added to 
the earlier work, this demonstration provided the necessary support for the Equilibration 
Thesis, which holds that decisions about justiciability, the merits, and remedies are 
pervasively interconnected. 
  14.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37–41 (2001) 
(arguing that in addition to interpreting vague constitutional language, courts must frequently 
develop and apply implementing tests and doctrines that are not directly traceable either to 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   483 
realization of which must depend on their interaction with other values or 
interests.15  Certainly liberty can be restricted for the sake of liberty.  But 
courts also appropriately take account of various practical and prudential 
considerations, including social costs and benefits, when they interpret 
language guaranteeing rights and develop implementing doctrines.16
Second, courts assess the social costs and benefits of defining particular 
rights in particular ways in light of other surrounding, implementing rules, 
policies, or doctrines,
 
17  and often feel as free to adjust implementing 
doctrines as to adjust definitions of rights.18  As noted already, courts that 
regard the overall package of rights and implementing doctrines as 
insufficiently robust may tend to adjust both rights and implementing 
doctrines in the same expansive direction.  For example, the Warren Court 
not only extended substantive rights, but also relaxed justiciability bars and 
revitalized the § 1983 cause of action.19  Similarly, courts that are 
concerned about the costs of rights may seek not only to redefine the rights 
themselves, but also to straiten surrounding doctrines bearing on rights’ 
enforcement.  Supreme Court practice since the Warren years exemplifies 
this phenomenon.  Although more conservative Justices have sometimes 
overruled or trimmed back Warren Court decisions establishing substantive 
rights (while broadening other rights), much of their response to the Warren 
legacy has come through heightened barriers to the judicial enforcement of 
rights.  The Court has thus expanded state sovereign immunity,20
 
the constitutional text or its originally understood meaning).  Even many constitutional 
originalists recognize a distinction between the interpretive function of identifying 
constitutional meaning and the related, but distinct, task of doctrinal “construction.” See, 
e.g.,  RANDY  E.  BARNETT,  RESTORING THE LOST  CONSTITUTION:  THE  PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 118–21 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 6–7 (1999). 
 made it 
  15.  Philosophers as well as lawyers have so recognized. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Jr., 
Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT.  L. REV. 519, 535–36 
(1979). 
  16.  See FALLON, supra note 14, at 47–52. 
  17.  See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 1, at 678–79; Levinson, supra note 13, at 889–90. 
  18.  With respect to official immunity in particular, the Supreme Court was explicit in the 
leading case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), that its previous decisions had 
attempted a “balancing of competing values,” id. at 816, defined by public “policy,” id. at 
813,  and that it regarded it as an appropriate judicial function to adjust the applicable 
standard in order to achieve its policy goals more successfully, see id. at 816–19; see also 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (recognizing that Harlow “completely 
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law” 
and that “we have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and 
should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law”); Kit Kinports, 
Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls:  Predicting the Course of 
Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 120 (1991) (“As . . . interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, the qualified immunity defense is not a matter of statutory construction, but instead is 
a creature of policy . . . .”). But see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922–23 (1984) (asserting 
that, absent precedent, the Court does “not have a license to establish immunities . . . in the 
interests of . . . sound public policy”). 
  19.  See Fallon, supra note 8, at 687–88. 
  20.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 76 (1996).  484  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
difficult to establish constitutional violations by cities and counties,21 
selectively stiffened justiciability doctrines,22  cut back on the Bivens23 
cause of action for damages against federal officials who have violated 
constitutional rights,24 and elevated the burdens of pleading in suits against 
government officials.25
The most interesting equilibrating adjustments, however, are those in 
which courts have imposed limits on remedial or enforcement mechanisms 
as part of an overall strategy that includes the expansion—rather than the 
contraction—of previously recognized substantive rights.  For example, the 
Warren Court loosely construed applicable equitable principles to establish 
that the school desegregation mandated by Brown v. Board of Education 
(Brown I)
 
26 need not commence immediately, but could proceed with “all 
deliberate speed.”27  Historical evidence establishes that some of the 
Justices would not have agreed to Brown I’s substantive holding in the 
absence of this remedial equilibration.28  The Warren Court also developed 
non-retroactivity doctrines under which its more sweeping expansions of 
the rights of criminal suspects did not apply to previously adjudicated 
cases.29  In the absence of such doctrines, the Court would almost certainly 
have been deterred from rendering some of its path-breaking decisions 
broadening the rights of criminal defendants, such as that in Miranda v. 
Arizona.30  Professor Jeffries has more generally defended the qualified 
immunity doctrine that protects government officers from suits from 
damages unless they have violated “clearly established” rights as 
facilitating the expansion of previously recognized guarantees.31
In asserting that courts do and should feel free to adjust a variety of 
variables to achieve optimal packages of rights and surrounding doctrines, I 
do not mean to imply that courts can make any adjustments that they might 
think desirable on policy grounds.  Courts function subject to a variety of 
role-based constraints, including obligations to act in conformity with 
constitutional and statutory language, to adhere to precedent in the absence 
of strong reasons to do otherwise, and to maintain a body of law that 
generally respects settled expectations.
 
32
 
  21.  See  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 482–84 (2002). 
  Indeed, as something of a legal 
  22.  See Fallon, supra note 8, at 688–89. 
  23.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). 
  24.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 735–40 (describing “retrenchment[s]” that 
“have given . . . reason to doubt Bivens’ continuing vitality”). 
  25.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1939 (2009); see also infra notes 135–38. 
  26.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  27.  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
  28.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 312–13 (2004). 
  29.  See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 293 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 618 (1965); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1738–44. 
  30.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
  31.  See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 97–105. 
  32.  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the 
Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1127–28 (2008) (arguing 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   485 
“doctrinalist,” I am disposed to be sharply critical of judicial decisions that 
disingenuously misapply pertinent sources of legal authority.  Nevertheless, 
as the Supreme Court’s historical pattern of doctrinal adjustment helps to 
establish, role-based obligations by no means eliminate the Justices’ 
capacity and indeed their obligation to exercise reasoned judgment in the 
pursuit of a well-designed overall alignment of rights, justiciability 
doctrines, causes of action, and immunity doctrines. 
The third assumption that underlies the Equilibration Thesis may be 
implicit in what I have said already:  the tools by which courts seek 
doctrinal equilibration should not be viewed as inherently suspect simply 
because they preclude some remedies or create obstacles to the enforcement 
of rights in some cases.  We may, for example, be better off with relatively 
broadly defined rights that are enforceable only through suits for 
injunctions, or in the context of criminal prosecutions, than we would be 
with more narrowly defined rights that were also enforceable through suits 
for damages. 
II.  DOCTRINAL EQUILIBRATION AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
It takes no intellectual heavy lifting to establish that official immunity 
doctrines perform an equilibrating function by diminishing the social costs 
that constitutional rights would have if officers who violated them were 
always strictly liable in suits for damages.  The Supreme Court cited some 
of the relevant considerations in the leading case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald33
[I]t cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant 
officials, but to society as a whole.  These social costs include the 
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing 
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of 
public office.  Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will 
“dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible 
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.”
: 
34
With the diminution of social costs being official immunity doctrines’ 
declared purpose, the most fundamental question about official immunity, it 
is usually thought, is whether—in light of the assumptions that the scope of 
a constitutional right has been defined and that the law grants the plaintiff 
an unalterable cause of action—a deviation from the ideal of an individually 
effective remedy for every constitutional violation can be justified.  As the 
Equilibration Thesis reveals, however, this question rests on a false 
premise.  It is a mistake, in thinking about immunity, to assume that in a 
world without immunity, other legal doctrines—including those defining 
rights and furnishing causes of action—would remain as they now are.  We 
will get a better picture of the role that immunity plays in our constitutional 
 
 
that the concept of a “rule of recognition” helps to explain the nature of constitutional law 
and judicial constraint and obligation). 
  33.  457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
  34.  Id. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 486  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
scheme if we try to imagine a world without official immunity of any kind.  
Would a legal regime without official immunity be better or worse than the 
one we have now?35
The difficulty in answering this question arises because it is impossible, 
as a practical matter, to imagine a world without official immunity in which 
nothing else changes.  Even critics of current immunity doctrine so 
recognize.  When they contemplate a world in which some or all officials 
lack immunity, they anticipate two changes, both of which they 
understandably regard as desirable.  First, victims of constitutional rights 
violations who now go uncompensated would receive compensation.
 
36  
Second, threats of individual liability would deter a number of 
constitutional violations that otherwise would have occurred.37  I once 
imagined a third change that I also thought normatively attractive:  the 
abolition of official immunity would effectively force governments to 
indemnify their officials.38  Otherwise, I reasoned, too many people would 
be deterred from entering government service.  If so, a de facto regime of 
strict governmental liability for injuries caused by officials’ constitutional 
violations would not only ensure compensation to victims, but also create 
powerful incentives for the government to take greater care to train and 
supervise its employees.39
In light of the Equilibration Thesis, however, it now seems to me deeply 
mistaken to think that we can realistically imagine a world in which official 
immunity doctrines were abolished and in which further, equilibrating 
adjustments—which critics of immunity doctrine would find less 
welcome—did not also occur.  To put the point succinctly, the social costs 
of rights and causes of action that have led the courts to develop immunity 
doctrines in our actual world would impel other, compensating changes in 
the law if immunity were abolished.  The easiest changes to imagine would 
involve the nature and scope of causes of action to recover damages for 
constitutional violations.  If, for example, it would be unfair and 
excessively costly to have judges be suable for damages whenever they 
ruled erroneously on a constitutional claim, or to have legislators be 
answerable for damages whenever they enacted statutes that a court 
subsequently held unconstitutional, courts might hold that no cause of 
action runs against judges when they have done no more than rule 
erroneously or against legislators when they have done no more than enact 
 
 
  35.  I continue to assume that the government could not be sued in its own name.   
Without this assumption, as I explained above, the question of official immunity would have 
no independent significance. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
  36.  See, e.g.,  David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:  Interpretive 
Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 498 n.5 (1992); 
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 
126–27. 
  37.  See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 36, at 498; Johns, supra note 36, at 127–28. 
  38.  See  Fallon & Meltzer,  supra  note  10, at 1823.  Others have reached similar 
conclusions. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously:  The Strange Results 
of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under  Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76 (1999) 
(summarizing the argument to this effect and citing sources). 
  39.  See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1823. 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   487 
an unconstitutional statute.  Indeed, one might well think of official 
immunity as limiting the scope of causes of action for damages relief in just 
this way. 
The suggestion that immunity doctrines currently function as de facto 
limits on causes of action to enforce constitutional rights of course depends 
on the possibility of a distinction between causes of action to sue for 
damages, which immunity doctrines frequently block, and causes of action 
to sue for injunctions, which official immunity bars much less frequently.  
But such a distinction already exists in actions against federal officials.  In a 
development conventionally traced to Ex parte Young,40 the Supreme Court 
has taken it for granted that the Constitution creates, or that courts should 
recognize, causes of action to sue for injunctive relief against ongoing 
constitutional violations.41  By contrast, absent a statutory authorization to 
sue, the Court has emphatically not assumed that the Constitution grants, or 
that courts should routinely uphold, causes of action for damages arising 
from constitutional violations.42
If I am right that immunity doctrines and limitations on causes of action 
frequently can serve as functional equivalents, in a world without 
immunity, the availability of Bivens actions against federal officials who 
violate constitutional rights might shrink even further.
  As a result, there are frequently 
constitutional causes of action to sue for injunctions when no cause of 
action to sue for damages would exist. 
43  The Court has 
already made plain that a damages remedy for constitutional violations “is 
not an automatic entitlement” and that “in most instances . . . a Bivens 
remedy [is] unjustified.”44  Without official immunity, the Court might 
begin to interpret § 1983, too, so that it would provide a cause of action to 
sue for damages for only a subset of constitutional violations.  Recognition 
of one or more non-textual exceptions to the statute would not be wholly 
unprecedented.  The Court has already held that § 1983 creates no cause of 
action for damages for constitutional violations occurring in the 
administration of state tax schemes.45
 
  40.  209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 
  41.  John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008), offers the revisionist 
view that the cause of action upheld in Young  derived from the common law, not the 
Constitution,  id.  at  990.  Even if Professor Harrison is correct, there is no doubt that 
constitutional causes of action to sue for injunctive relief are now routinely upheld. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1111–13 
(2010). 
  42.  See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
  43.  On post-Bivens retrenchments that have occurred already, see HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 11, at 735–40. 
  44.  Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
  45.  See  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719 (1996) (citing Fair 
Assessment in Real Estate, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107 (1981)) (characterizing 
McNary, which had held that federal courts were barred from granting relief in a damages 
action against local officials alleged to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment by 
assessing taxes unequally, as a decision “about the scope of the § 1983 cause of action, not 
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Perhaps, however, the Court would regard judicial recognition of a series 
of non-textual exceptions to § 1983 as overreaching the judicial role.  If so, 
in a world in which the absence of official immunity opened the door to 
damages relief for all constitutional violations—including those committed 
in good faith by judges, prosecutors, and legislators—I think it more likely 
than not that Congress would amend the statute to narrow the § 1983 cause 
of action.  As the history of Bivens doctrine suggests, the absence of a cause 
of action for damages relief for all deprivations of constitutional rights by 
federal officials has not been thought unconstitutional.46  If there are any 
situations in which the Constitution specifically and uniquely mandates the 
availability of damages remedies, there do not appear to be many.47
As another possible response to a world without official immunity, the 
Supreme Court might diminish the scope of at least some substantive 
constitutional rights.  Indeed, I think I can identify cases in which the Court 
has already trimmed the scope of constitutional rights for the purpose of 
stemming what it has regarded as an undue flood of suits for damages into 
federal court. 
 
Expressing concerns that the Due Process Clause should not become a 
font of tort law, the Court held in Paul v. Davis48 that a plaintiff whose 
name and photograph had been included in a police flyer identifying active 
shoplifters had not alleged an actionable due process violation because mere 
harm to reputation does not count as a deprivation of constitutionally 
protected “liberty.”49  Paul’s narrow interpretation of the due process right, 
which found little support in prior decisions,50  was almost certainly 
“motivated by concerns about the section 1983 remedy” and the social costs 
of “the wholesale federalization of tort claims against state and local 
government officials and the corresponding prospect of massive damages 
liability.”51
The Court further narrowed its interpretation of constitutionally protected 
due process rights, apparently in response to the same concern, in Parratt v. 
Taylor,
 
52 which held that random and unauthorized deprivations of liberty 
and property do not violate the Due Process Clause unless and until a state 
has failed to provide post-deprivation corrective process.53
 
  46.  See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1779–87. 
  Again voicing 
concerns about the social costs of permitting § 1983 and the Due Process 
Clause to become fonts of tort law, the Court pared back the scope of 
previously recognized due process rights once more in Daniels v. 
  47.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 740–41. 
  48.  424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
  49.  Id. at 697, 712–14. 
  50.  See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 
423–29 (1977); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:  A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 293, 324–28 (1976). 
  51.  Levinson, supra note 13, at 893. 
  52.  451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
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Williams,54 which held that merely negligent deprivations of liberty and 
property do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.55
With the Court having shrunk the scope of the due process guarantee in 
Paul,  Parratt, and Daniels, it is easy to imagine the Justices similarly 
circumscribing other rights if, in the absence of official immunity, they 
regarded the social costs of damages actions as too high.  For example, the 
Court could plausibly respond to a flood of suits seeking damages for 
unreasonable searches and seizures by holding that if any reasonable person 
could think a search reasonable, it is not unreasonable.
 
56
Even if some rights shrank in the absence of official immunity, it is of 
course hard to imagine that all rights would do so.  Nor have I meant to 
suggest that all causes of action that are now barred by official immunity 
would necessarily be recalibrated to a point of extensional equivalence with 
the current regime.  To the contrary, it seems undeniable that the 
availability of official immunity sometimes makes a difference, even if the 
central premises of the Equilibration Thesis are accepted.  Nevertheless, the 
thought experiment of trying to imagine a world without official immunity 
persuades me that if courts and other decision makers were deprived of 
official immunity as an equilibrating device, they would at least sometimes 
turn to other tools in an effort to reduce the overall social costs of packages 
of rights and surrounding doctrines.  Some of the results might be better 
than those that official immunity now produces, but others might prove 
worse. 
 
If so, then we should begin to see official immunity not as an inherently 
regrettable doctrine, but as a tool that can be used wisely or unwisely in 
efforts to promote ends that we should sometimes judge more laudable than 
deplorable.  In particular, we should recognize the possibility that official 
immunity doctrine could serve goals that those who favor broadly defined 
rights should endorse. 
III.  THE NATURE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AS A TOOL OF EQUILIBRATION 
So far, I have spoken generally about the potential value of official 
immunity as an equilibrating mechanism, but I have not  examined the 
peculiar features in light of which we should assess its attractiveness 
relative to other doctrines.  This part offers a preliminary survey and 
appraisal.  To summarize my conclusions at the outset, among official 
immunity’s most striking features is its trans-substantive character, which 
makes it a blunt tool for achieving doctrinal equilibration.  Nevertheless, 
immunity doctrine is not wholly inflexible.  Elements of flexibility come 
from its potentially variable applicability to suits for injunctions and suits 
 
  54.  474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
  55.  Id. at 335–36. 
  56.  Cf.  Levinson,  supra  note  13, at 915 (“In a world where damages for every 
unreasonable search were potentially enormous, the Fourth Amendment guidelines for what 
counts as reasonable would likely become both broader and, to create safe harbors for police 
attempting in good faith to follow the rules, clearer and more precise.”). 490  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
for damages, and its capacity to adjust the degree of officials’ protection 
against suit on a function-sensitive basis. 
A.  Trans-substantive Character 
Earlier, I said that official immunity operates so much like a limit on 
causes of action that it could be so conceptualized for some purposes.  But 
whereas causes of action are often defined in substantive terms—
establishing entitlements to seek redress for violations of particular rights—
immunity doctrine does not, for example, operate as a distinctive limit on 
rights to sue for First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause violations.  
Rather, it establishes a trans-substantive barrier to suits against particular 
officials, regardless of the constitutional provision that those officials 
allegedly violated.  Perhaps this feature of official immunity doctrine 
should not be viewed as unalterable.  In theory, it would be possible for the 
Supreme Court (or Congress) to make immunity—or the degree of 
immunity that an official can claim—depend on the right that the official 
allegedly violated.  The Court, however, has never taken this approach.  At 
the very least, trans-substantivity is a feature of official immunity doctrine 
as we have always known it. 
The trans-substantive character of immunity doctrine makes it a poor tool 
for attempting to achieve an equilibration of the values underlying 
particular rights and the social costs of enforcing them.  A trans-substantive 
immunity must be defended instead on the ground that some of the social 
costs inherent in the enforcement of rights vary so little from right to right 
that they can be addressed most efficiently on an across-the-board basis.  I 
shall consider this possibility slightly more fully below.57
B.  Flexibility Along Other Dimensions 
 
Although official immunity is utterly inflexible along the dimension of 
trans-substantivity, it has notable elements of flexibility along other 
dimensions. 
1.  Potentially Variable Applicability to Damages and Injunctions 
Although the range of potential remedies for official misconduct is 
enormously broad, damages and injunctions rank among the most 
familiar.58  Among official immunity doctrines’ elements of flexibility, they 
can apply differentially to suits for damages and suits for injunctions.59
 
  57.  See infra Part IV.F. 
  For 
the most part, the Supreme Court has placed little reliance on immunity 
  58.  In Henry Hart’s celebrated formulation, “Congress necessarily has a wide choice in 
the selection of remedies, and . . . a complaint about action [substituting one for another] can 
rarely be of constitutional dimension.” Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit 
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:  An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366 
(1953). 
  59.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995, 1007–11. 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   491 
doctrines to bar injunctive remedies.60  Although the rule once was 
otherwise, the Court increasingly appears to regard injunctive relief against 
ongoing constitutional violations as being—at least in many contexts—the 
most appropriate if not minimally necessary remedy to give vitality to 
constitutional guarantees.61
If one accepts the premise that injunctions are normally (even if not 
always) an appropriate or even constitutionally necessary remedy, any 
trans-substantive barrier to injunctive relief obviously looks undesirable.  In 
cases involving suits for injunctions, the Court has therefore relied more on 
other doctrines to mitigate some of the social costs that broad packages of 
rights and remedies would otherwise entail.  These include equitable 
barriers to the award of injunctions under some circumstances
 
62  and 
standing and ripeness doctrines.63
For various reasons, however, none of these other mechanisms is well 
suited to reducing the social costs  of suits for damages.  For example, 
equitable principles do not apply to damages actions,
 
64 and parties who 
seek damages for past injuries almost never encounter difficulties in 
satisfying the demands of standing doctrine.65  The juxtaposition of official 
immunity in damages actions with non-immunity in suits for injunctions 
does not reflect a necessary pairing.  Official immunity doctrines bar suits 
for injunctions as well as damages against some officials under some 
circumstances.66
2.  Degrees of Official Immunity:  Absolute and Qualified 
  Nevertheless, among the Supreme Court’s most recurring 
strategies of doctrinal equilibration is coupling official immunity from suits 
for damages with non-immunity in suits for injunctions. 
Official immunity need not be all or nothing.  So-called absolute 
immunity confers inviolable protection against liability in the suits to which 
 
  60.  See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 108 (“In general, constitutional tort actions against state 
officers for manifestly official misconduct are routinely allowed . . . .”). 
  61.  See Fallon, supra note 41, at 1111–13. 
  62.  Among the most significant are the Pullman  and  Younger  abstention doctrines, 
which take their names, respectively, from Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 
312 U.S. 496 (1941), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  For discussion of the 
Pullman doctrine, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1057–83; for a discussion of 
Younger abstention, see id. at 1083–1128. 
  63.  See, e.g.,  City of Los  Angeles  v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10  (1983) (invoking 
standing doctrine as a barrier to a suit seeking injunctive relief); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 493–99 (1974) (holding a suit for equitable relief against an array of local officials 
nonjusticiable). 
  64.  See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996). 
  65.  See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (holding that a party who had suffered a past injury 
had standing to sue for damages but not injunctive relief). 
  66.  The Supreme Court has held clearly that officials acting in a legislative capacity are 
normally immune from suits seeking to enjoin them in that capacity. See Supreme Court of 
Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732–34 (1980); Eastland v. U.S. 
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502–03 (1975).  For a discussion of the scope of this 
immunity, and of the possibility that the President might have immunity from suits for 
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it applies.67  But there can be less than absolute or what the Supreme Court 
has characterized as “qualified” immunity.68  The Court currently 
recognizes just one type of qualified immunity, which, where it exists, 
defeats suits for damages unless an official violated “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”69
In theory, it would be possible for the Court to introduce multiple tiers of 
immunity, or to have the degree of available immunity rise or fall along a 
sliding scale.  The Court apparently contemplated such an approach in 
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
  All else being equal, absolute immunity more sharply 
diminishes both the value of rights and the social costs of their enforcement 
than does qualified immunity. 
70  when it said that “in varying scope, a qualified 
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the 
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and the 
responsibilities of the [defendant’s] office.”71  Professor Schuck has also 
advocated a variability of this kind.72  Although this approach surely 
deserves consideration, it has proven challenging for the courts to 
administer even the single qualified immunity standard that the Supreme 
Court articulated in Harlow.73  At least since Harlow, the Court has applied 
that single standard invariantly to all executive officials to whom it has not 
extended absolute immunity.74
3.  Potential for Function-Based Application 
 
With the Supreme Court having recognized official immunity of just two 
rigid types, it has of course needed to determine which defendant officials 
receive which.  The Court does so based not on officials’ titles or their 
location in a particular branch of government, but according to their 
functions.75  To oversimplify slightly, the Court has held that officials sued 
for performing judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial functions possess 
absolute immunity from damages liability.76  Officials performing nearly all 
other functions receive qualified immunity.77
Whether function-based distinctions among levels of official immunity 
promote optimal packages of rights and implementing doctrines obviously 
rests on a complex mix of empirical and normative considerations.  I cannot 
pause even to list, much less to probe, all of them here.  But two 
 
 
  67.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995. 
  68.  See id. 
  69.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
  70.  416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). 
  71.  Id.;  see also  Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975) (articulating 
immunity principles applicable to school board members). 
  72.  See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 56. 
  73.  457 U.S. 800. 
  74.  See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995 (describing the qualified 
immunity standard and contrasting it with absolute immunity). 
  75.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810–11; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995. 
  76.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 811. 
  77.  See id. at 807 (“[Q]ualified immunity represents the norm.”). 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   493 
assumptions seem especially central:  officials performing some functions 
are more likely to be the targets of greater numbers of distracting, yet 
ultimately meritless, suits than are officials performing other functions;78 
and constitutional violations by judges and prosecutors are more likely to be 
deterred and adequately remedied by mechanisms that immunity does not 
displace, such as dismissals of indictments and reversals on appeal, than are 
violations by officials performing other functions.79
If we provisionally grant the validity of these assumptions, and further 
assume that there will be two tiers of immunity doctrine—absolute and 
qualified—then official immunity doctrine affords the Court three viable 
modes of doctrinal adjustment.  First, the Court can expand or contract the 
range of functions for which officials possess absolute rather than qualified 
immunity.  It did so, for example, when it held that the President was 
entitled to absolute immunity in the performance of all presidential 
functions in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
 
80  The Court has also made a number of 
consequential decisions about which functions are sufficiently prosecutorial 
and judicial to merit absolute immunity.81
Second, the Court could contract the range of functions for which 
officials receive any immunity at all.  Although qualified immunity now 
seems firmly entrenched, matters were apparently otherwise for much of 
early American history.
 
82  Indeed, it was not until 1967, in Pierson v. 
Ray,83
 
  78.  See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 that the Supreme Court expressly held an executive official immune 
from damages liability for a constitutional (as distinguished from a common 
  79.  See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
  80.  457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
  81.  See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (determining that a judge 
acted in a non-judicial capacity when firing a probation officer); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 520–21 (1985) (holding that the Attorney General does not act in a prosecutorial 
capacity when authorizing a warrantless national security wiretap). 
  82.  See, e.g.,  Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 150 (1851) (affirming 
damages award against U.S. military officer for wrongful confiscation of plaintiff’s goods 
and rejecting military necessity defense); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 
(1804) (holding a Navy captain personally liable for unlawfully seizing a Danish vessel 
despite his having acted under presidential orders).  An important recent study, James F. 
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:  Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic,  85  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  1862 (2010), 
concludes that federal officials generally enjoyed no immunity from suit during the 
antebellum era, but that Congress routinely provided indemnification for official action taken 
in good faith discharge of official duties, see id. at 1924–26.  For other valuable discussions 
of early practice involving official immunity and liability, see David P. Currie, Sovereign 
Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 149, 149–56; David E. 
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1, 5–40 (1972) (tracing the history of official immunity doctrine, including its roots in 
English common law); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government:  Sovereignty, 
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 553–57 (2003); 
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:  Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. 
REV.  1,  19–39  (1963);  and  Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and 
Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–17 (1987) (examining the prevalence of 
actions against officers in the early nineteenth century). 
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law) violation.84
Third, the Court could adjust the standard by which it defines qualified 
immunity.  Although that formula has remained relatively untouched in 
recent decades, the Court made a major adjustment in its now canonical 
1982 decision in Harlow.  Prior to Harlow, officials received immunity 
only insofar as they acted with both objective reasonableness and subjective 
good faith.
  The prospect that some officials might have no immunity 
from damages actions is thus not wholly unimaginable. 
85  Harlow extended the protective shield of official immunity to 
all officials who do not violate clearly established rights, regardless of their 
motivations.86  According to Harlow, permitting suits against officials 
whenever plaintiffs alleged that they had acted with subjective bad faith 
gave rise to excessively high social costs.87
4.  Potential to Link Liability to Clearly Established Rights 
 
As the currently applicable qualified immunity formula illustrates, it is 
possible to deploy official immunity to bar suits in cases in which the law 
was not previously clearly established, but to allow suits in cases where 
clearly established rights were violated.  This potential usage obviously 
makes official immunity doctrines attractive as tools for doctrinal 
equilibration insofar as one could justifiably believe that the clarity with 
which rights were previously established bears importantly on any of a 
number of questions.  These include:  the appropriate balance to strike 
between deterring officials from violating rights, on the one hand, and 
chilling officials from acting conscientiously to discharge their 
responsibilities, on the other hand;88 the fairness of assessing liability for 
violations of rights when their applicability to new facts was not readily 
foreseeable;89 and the incentives and constraints that courts should be made 
to consider when asked to resolve a previously doubtful constitutional 
question by either upholding or rejecting a claim of right.90
Whether the clarity with which rights are established does in fact bear 
importantly on these matters obviously hinges on a number of empirical and 
normative assumptions.  Although I shall not pause to examine those 
assumptions here, their validity will emerge as an important topic of 
discussion in Part IV. 
 
 
  84.  Id. at 557. 
  85.  See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (affirming that immunity would 
be defeated if an official acted “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional rights or other injury”). 
  86.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
  87.  Among these, the Court emphasized “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of 
official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from 
acceptance of public office,” and “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
  88.  See, e.g., id. at 817–19. 
  89.  See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts:  Reflections on 
the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 96–101 (1989). 
  90.  See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 97–110. 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   495 
C.  The Difficulty of Assessing the Comparative Attractiveness                    
of Official Immunity 
Rigorous assessment of the attractiveness of official immunity as a 
mechanism of doctrinal equilibration would obviously include a 
comparative aspect.  A decision maker assessing immunity doctrine as a 
tool of doctrinal equilibration would ideally consult a menu of other 
options, supplemented  by sound appraisals of the capacities of other 
mechanisms, to achieve an optimal balance of the social costs and benefits 
of constitutional rights and surrounding doctrines.  Unfortunately, however, 
the work needed to ground good comparative judgments in every case 
would be Herculean, far beyond the capacities of actual judges and 
scholars.  Indeed, one well might doubt whether courts or other decision 
makers could know even a small fraction of what they would ideally know 
in order to make good judgments about whether and how to employ official 
immunity doctrine in light of the Equilibration Thesis. 
This recognition should by no means disable further analysis.  The need 
to make decisions based on imperfect information is endemic not only to 
the judicial function, but also to the human condition more generally.  The 
crucial point is thus a simple one:  in thinking about the attractiveness of 
official immunity in light of the Equilibration Thesis, we should look 
imaginatively for better mechanisms for achieving immunity doctrine’s 
purposes. 
IV.  THE EFFICACY OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AS A TOOL                                   
FOR ACHIEVING IDENTIFIED PURPOSES 
Having examined some of the distinctive features of official immunity as 
a tool for adjusting the value and social costs of overall packages of rights 
and enforcement mechanisms, in this part I shall critically examine a 
number of claims sometimes made about the desirability of immunity 
doctrines in damages actions.91
A.  Optimizing the Balance Between Benefits of Deterrence                      
and Costs of Chilling 
  A recurrent theme will be that although the 
leading justifications of official immunity doctrine frequently depend on 
projected consequences—involving how immunity or its absence would 
shape official behavior—we currently lack much of the information that 
would aid crucially in making informed projections. 
In Harlow, the Supreme Court postulated that an important purpose of 
immunity doctrine is to strike the right balance between deterring officials 
from violating constitutional rights and avoiding an undue chilling of 
conscientious officials from the fearless discharge of their duties.92
 
  91.  The limitation of my inquiry to damages actions reflects considerations of relative 
importance, not logical necessity.  As I said above, official immunity doctrines could, and 
sometimes do, apply in suits for injunctions as well as in suits for damages. 
  In 
recalibrating the qualified immunity standard in light of this goal, the Court 
  92.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819; see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974). 496  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
relied heavily on the assumption that officials, absent immunity, would face 
the threat of personal liability for constitutional violations committed in the 
ostensible performance of their official duties.93  Yet this assumption is by 
no means obviously correct.  To the contrary, most scholars appear to 
believe that many, and perhaps most, officials are indemnified by their 
employers for some or all constitutional violations for which they might be 
sued.94
In assessments of whether official immunity doctrine is well designed to 
achieve its purposes, the question of indemnification practices holds large 
potential significance.  Officials would indubitably respond differently to 
the prospect of governmental liability than they would to the threat of 
personal liability.  Yet, roughly thirty years after Harlow, no good empirical 
study has sought to establish the pervasiveness and scope of governmental 
indemnification.
 
95  This gap in empirical knowledge crucially handicaps 
instrumental analysis.  If indemnification occurs routinely, the prospect of 
needing to pay judgments against officials might motivate governments to 
establish training and deterrent mechanisms of their own96
Another assumption underlying the Harlow standard is that officials can 
reasonably be expected to keep abreast of appellate court decisions clearly 
establishing applicable law.
—a consideration 
that I mentioned earlier and shall examine more closely below.  
Nevertheless, the calculation necessary to set the immunity standard at the 
right level to achieve an optimal balance between deterring constitutional 
violations and unduly chilling conscientious official action would need to 
be far more complex than the analysis that the Court performed in Harlow. 
97  This assumption also seems questionable, at 
least in the absence of a demonstration that government agencies provide 
officials who are not lawyers with continuing education.  If government 
entities routinely indemnify their officials, they would certainly have an 
incentive to provide those officials with training regarding applicable law, 
including court decisions.98
 
  93.  See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 56 (emphasizing the significance of this threat). 
  But just as we cannot confidently claim to 
  94.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 
VA. L. REV. 47, 50 & n.16 (1998) (reporting on the basis of “personal experience” and 
anecdotal evidence that “[t]he state or local government officer who is acting within the 
scope of his or her employment in something other than extreme bad faith can count on 
governmental defense and indemnification”); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity:  
Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2000) (reporting 
that indemnification is “generally thought to be widespread”). But cf. SCHUCK, supra note 2, 
at 85 (describing indemnification as “neither certain nor universal”). 
  95.  See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort:  The Remedial Revolution in 
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law,  52  VAND.  L.  REV.  57, 108 (1999) 
(surveying debates about the prevalence of indemnification and calling for an empirical 
study). 
  96.  See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980); SCHUCK, supra 
note 2, at 102–06; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1823. 
  97.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19 (postulating that “a reasonably competent public 
official should know the law governing his conduct”). 
  98.  Cf.  Pfander & Hunt, supra  note  82, at 1922–24 (suggesting that during the 
antebellum era, federal officials generally had no immunity from damages actions, but that 
Congress routinely provided indemnification for official action taken in good faith discharge 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   497 
know how widely indemnification occurs, we might doubt how well we 
understand how the availability of indemnification would affect the 
incentives of high level officials to implement continuing education 
programs for lower level employees.  Among other reasons for uncertainty, 
Daryl Levinson has raised important questions about whether governmental 
bodies—which are not-for-profit enterprises—respond to threats of 
government liability in the same way as individuals or corporate officers 
would respond to threats of personal or corporate liability.99
Although gaps in current learning make it difficult to make good 
comparisons between official immunity doctrines and other possible 
mechanisms for achieving the optimal calibration between the benefits of 
deterring constitutional violations and the costs of chilling conscientious 
officials, alternative or complementary strategies deserve consideration.   
Two may suffice as examples. 
 
First, it might be desirable to reconsider current doctrines that largely 
shield governments from direct liability for their officials’ wrongs, 
especially if empirical studies were to establish that government employers 
routinely indemnify their officials anyway.100  I said above that I did not 
think that across-the-board strict liability would be feasible or attractive in 
light of the Equilibration Thesis.  To repeat what seems to me to be a clear 
example, it is nearly unimaginable that the government should have to pay 
damages every time a judge erroneously deprives someone of a claimed 
constitutional right, even if the error is corrected on appeal.  Nevertheless, a 
more limited regime of government liability could imaginably improve the 
current balance between deterrence of violations and chilling of 
conscientious action by creating better incentives for improved hiring, 
training, and supervision.101
 
of official duties, and that this arrangement left responsibility for adjusting incentives for 
official action with Congress). 
 
  99.  See  Daryl J. Levinson,  Making Government Pay:  Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2000); see also SCHUCK, 
supra note 2, at 125 (asserting that “our understanding of how bureaucracies behave is so 
rudimentary” that it is difficult to predict how changes in legal liability rules would affect 
behavior). But see Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:  The Deterrent 
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 858–59 (2001) (asserting that 
tort remedies effectively deter governmental misconduct).  It also might matter whether 
indemnifying institutions rely on insurance or self-insurance to pay judgments against their 
officials and, if the latter, to what extent the consequences of an adverse judgment against a 
police officer, for example, would be felt distinctively within the police department that had 
failed to deter the officer’s wrongdoing, rather than being spread across the entirety of a 
municipal budget. 
  100.  For proposals to this effect, see, for example, SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 100–21; 
Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation:  Who Should Pay?, 50 
U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 1000–07 (1989). 
  101.  See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 100–13 (advocating such an approach).  As Larry 
Kramer and Alan Sykes have argued, the relevant calculations in designing an ideal liability 
regime would be complex, depending on such considerations as whether officials possess the 
personal resources to pay judgments against them and on transaction costs, including those 
necessary to negotiate contracts with indemnification provisions. See Larry Kramer & Alan 
O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. 
CT. REV. 249, 272–94.  They very plausibly conclude, however, that government liability is 498  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
Insofar as cities and counties—which do not possess sovereign 
immunity—are concerned, reforms of this character would need to involve 
two elements.  On the one hand, either the Supreme Court or Congress 
would have to revisit and overturn decisions that have categorically rejected 
respondeat superior liability and made municipalities’ causal responsibility 
for their officials’ torts virtually impossible to establish.102  On the other 
hand, the Court or Congress would need to establish exactly what 
municipalities could be liable for—if not, once again, for the damage 
occasioned by every constitutional violation committed by every 
government official, including every erroneous judicial ruling and every 
attempt by a prosecutor to enforce a statute that a court subsequently holds 
unconstitutional.  Although a myriad of important details would need to be 
worked out, establishing sensible standards of municipal liability would 
almost certainly require displacement of the holding of Owen v. City of 
Independence103  that municipalities cannot claim any good faith or 
comparable immunity from damages claims when plaintiffs state otherwise 
valid causes of action.104  It might, for example, be desirable to permit 
otherwise suable entities to benefit in litigation from having good internal 
mechanisms for training their officials to respect constitutional norms and 
for disciplining those who run amok.105
Where the constitutional violations of state employees are at stake, the 
Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence may be too deeply 
entrenched for us currently to imagine a judicially mandated transition from 
 
 
likely to produce better deterrence and training than officer liability when the officers are 
judgment-proof. See id. at 276–87.  (I add the qualification that Kramer and Sykes have 
“very plausibly” reached their conclusions because of empirical uncertainties about whether 
public officials making decisions involving potential expenditures of public money have the 
same incentives as officers of private, for-profit corporations.  See  supra  note  99  and 
accompanying text.)  Where significant transaction costs exist, Kramer and Sykes also 
recommend that government liability should be limited to cases involving negligent 
supervision and training. See Kramer & Sykes, supra, at 287–94. 
  102.  Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397 (1997), which two other Justices joined, called for consideration of this course. 
See id. at 430–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
  103.  445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
  104.  Id. at 638. 
  105.  In the partly analogous case of “hostile environment” suits against employers under 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, an employer is “‘subject to vicarious liability . . . for 
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with . . . authority over the 
employee,’” but the employer has an affirmative defense when it “‘exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any’ discriminatory conduct and ‘the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.’” Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & 
Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2009) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).  Studies cited by the Court suggest that this affirmative 
defense has “prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, 
preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct” and that “[e]mployers are thus subject to 
a strong  inducement to ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their 
operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability.” Id. 2011]  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS   499 
officer to state liability,106 at least in the short term.  Congress, however, 
suffers from no precedent-based incapacity.  Acting pursuant to Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could strip the states of sovereign 
immunity from suits predicated on their officials’ constitutional 
violations.107  If it did so, it could provide for state liability based on 
whatever kind of fault it might deem appropriate.  It could also, if it so 
chose, create a statutory exception to the otherwise available federal cause 
of action for cases in which state law establishes an adequate alternative 
compensation system—which could potentially be one with sensible limits 
on punitive or even compensatory damages.108
In offering vague suggestions such as these, I make no pretense of having 
established what a preferable alternative to our current official immunity 
regime would look like, or even of having shown that a preferable 
alternative necessarily exists.  Grave difficulties could potentially arise in 
efforts to work out details.  For example, if judicial determinations of entity 
liability would require fine-grained assessments of the adequacy of training, 
supervision, and disciplinary mechanisms that courts are ill-equipped to 
make, then the evident manageability of a formula that predicates liability 
on the presence or absence of clearly established law might look better by 
comparison.
 
109  I do not exclude this possibility.  It seems clear, however, 
that the assumptions underlying the current regime of official liability 
subject to Harlow’s “clearly established law” standard are sufficiently 
doubtful that scholars could profitably consider the potential superiority of 
alternative mechanisms for achieving an optimal balance between 
deterrence of constitutional violations and chill of conscientious official 
action.110
A second possible mechanism for improving the calibration between 
deterring constitutional violations and avoiding undue chilling of public-
spirited action is far easier to describe, at least in concept.  In crafting 
doctrine, the Supreme Court should avoid the kind of complexity that 
would make it unreasonable to expect officials to know where 
constitutional boundaries lie.  The rule of law may not inherently require a 
law of rules,
 
111
 
  106.  See David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication:  An 
Introspection,  86  TEX.  L.  REV.  929, 947–56 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s decisions, 
although erroneous, should be accepted on grounds of stare decisis). 
 but it is surely more reasonable to expect officials to know 
and comply with broad, clear rules than it is to expect them to keep up with 
a flow of judicial opinions that clarify the law only from the perspective of 
legal specialists.  Existing doctrine partly reflects this recognition.  When 
  107.  See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006). 
  108.  Cf. Oren, supra note 100, at 1006. 
  109.  See generally  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006) (discussing judicially manageable 
standards as a requisite for judicial decision making). 
  110.  For a broad-based and thoughtful attack on judicial decision making predicated on 
this likely fiction, see Pillard, supra note 38. 
  111.  Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
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the controlling tests of constitutional validity take  the form of vague 
standards, the correct application of which depends on nuanced 
determinations, the Court makes it difficult for plaintiffs to show that 
“clearly established” law governs their cases:  it insists that “the right the 
official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a 
. . . particularized . . . sense.”112
However one judges these proposals, two things seem clear.  First, we 
could make far better judgments of how well qualified immunity serves the 
function of getting the right balance between deterrence of constitutional 
violations and chill of conscientious official action if we had better 
empirical information.  Second, given that immunity will always be an 
imperfect device, we ought to consider other possible mechanisms that 
would either complement official immunity or perform its intended 
functions better. 
  Insofar as legal complexity tends to 
support claims of official immunity, more sharply etched doctrines could 
thus serve better both to deter official misconduct and to ensure 
compensation to victims. 
B.  Limiting Liability to Cases of Moral Entitlement to Compensation 
The Supreme Court has frequently suggested that it would be unfair to 
hold officials liable if they could not reasonably have known that their 
conduct would violate constitutional rights.113  Going a step further, 
Professor Jeffries argues that a fault system is preferable to a strict liability 
regime as a matter of fairness.114  He additionally claims that the currently 
prevailing immunity doctrines create a reasonable approximation of fault-
based liability, especially through the qualified immunity standard of 
Harlow.115
With the inquiry focused in this way, the two basic questions are whether 
Jeffries is right that a fault system is preferable to a strict liability regime 
and whether we currently have a structure of immunity and liability rules 
that is mostly fault-based in the morally relevant sense.  The answers are 
not obvious.  In the most characteristic situations in which the law makes 
fault a condition of liability—such as under the negligence standard in 
  Even if we were to grant the assumption that Jeffries is right 
about the desirability of a fault system, absolute immunity sometimes bars 
recovery in cases in which fault unquestionably exists.  What is more, even 
qualified immunity seems overbroad insofar as it protects officials who act 
with subjective bad faith and violate constitutional rights.  But these are 
obvious points.  No one denies that immunity doctrine bars recovery in 
some cases of fault.  The question is whether the desirability of a fault 
system justifies the main outlines of our current immunity regime, not all of 
its details, some of which might of course be justifiable on other grounds 
anyway. 
 
  112.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
  113.  See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975). 
  114.  See Jeffries, supra note 89, at 95–96. 
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private tort law—the law also defines the parties’ rights and duties by 
reference to negligence.116  If non-negligent conduct violates no one’s 
rights, it is easy to see why a party who acted without fault, and thus 
violated no one’s rights, should have no moral duty of compensation.  By 
contrast, the “clearly established law” standard for qualified immunity 
excludes recovery by people who have suffered rights violations.117  This 
distinction has potential importance.  From the premise that the law should 
sometimes define rights by reference to “fault,” in one sense of the term, it 
does not follow directly that people who have rights, and whose rights have 
been violated, have no moral entitlement to compensation unless the right-
violator acted with “fault” in another sense.118  Sometimes the law provides 
monetary remedies for violations of rights that were not previously clearly 
established, including in cases involving regulatory takings.119
However one ultimately judges Jeffries’s argument, the Equilibration 
Thesis that I have advanced in this Essay may offer a distinctive reason for 
concluding that no moral entitlement to compensation exists in many cases 
involving rights that were not previously clearly established.  As noted 
above, fairness-based objections to immunity have frequently assumed that 
substantive rights are constants, not variables.
 
120
This possible justification for a “clearly established rights” standard is 
undeniably overbroad.  Even in the absence of qualified immunity, some 
plaintiffs for whom qualified immunity currently bars recovery would 
persuade courts to accept their claims of constitutional right.  Nevertheless, 
the suggestion that the Harlow  standard helps to restrict damages 
  The fairness-based claim 
to a damages remedy for every violation of every right surely weakens 
when we recognize that, in the absence of official immunity, at least some 
substantive rights might be defined more narrowly.  Absent immunity, 
some right-holders who sue to seek redress for violations would possess no 
rights and, accordingly, no moral entitlement to relief. 
 
  116.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (liability for negligence 
exists when, inter alia, an “interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion” and 
the “conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the [plaintiff]”). 
  117.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
  118.  Jeffries points out, rightly, that the availability of qualified immunity under Harlow 
depends on a “negligence-type inquiry” into whether an official should have known that her 
conduct was unconstitutional. Jeffries, supra note 89, at 100; see also Barbara E. Armacost, 
Qualified Immunity:  Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 667 (1998) (arguing that 
“notice functions as a surrogate for fault”).  Nevertheless, there is a distinction between 
negligence as a standard for determining whether a wrong has been done and negligence as a 
standard for determining whether a wrongdoer owes compensation to her victim.  It is at 
least arguable, for example, that wrongdoing is inherent in the idea of a constitutional 
violation, see Nahmod, supra note 4, at 1008, or that constitutional violations should trigger 
compensation even in the absence of subjective official fault,  see  Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“[T]he principle of equitable loss-spreading has 
joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct.”). 
  119.  See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306–07, 320 (1987) (holding that where government has taken 
property by land use regulation, a landowner may “recover damages for the time before it is 
finally determined that the regulation constitutes a ‘taking’ of his property”). 
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compensation to cases of moral entitlement may have at least some 
explanatory and justificatory power for reasons that are conceptually 
unrelated to official fault or lack thereof.  If so, the ultimate question would 
be whether an admittedly overbroad “clearly established rights” standard is 
adequately justified, not because it is inherently fair as applied to every case 
(as Jeffries suggests), but because it is not unfair as applied to some 
significant fraction of cases and may be preferable to other potential 
mechanisms of doctrinal equilibration when the full gamut of potentially 
pertinent costs and benefits comes into view. 
C.  Avoiding Chill with Respect to Change of Law 
Professor Jeffries has also argued that immunity doctrines, and especially 
qualified immunity, are desirable because they eliminate a practical 
impediment that courts would otherwise encounter when considering 
whether to recognize rights that they had not previously established.121
In Saucier v. Katz,
  As 
I have said already, Jeffries is surely right that official immunity serves the 
function of facilitating legal change.  But it is a separate question how well 
immunity does so. 
122 the Court attempted to push immunity doctrine in a 
maximally change-facilitating direction by holding that courts should 
always rule first on whether a plaintiff had alleged a constitutional 
violation.123  Only if the answer was affirmative should a court go on to 
address the further question whether the right was clearly established at the 
time of the defendant’s alleged action.  More recently, in Pearson v. 
Callahan,124 the Court overruled Saucier and held that courts should make 
a case-by-case determination of whether to decide first whether a rights 
violation occurred or to proceed directly to the question whether the right 
asserted by the plaintiff was clearly established.125  This decision renders 
qualified immunity a less effective mechanism for facilitating legal change 
than it was under Saucier.126
Under these circumstances, alternative mechanisms to stop changes in 
law from becoming too costly merit discussion.  Absent immunity, the 
prospect of imposing retroactive official liability would create the greatest 
impediments to change of law in cases in which courts contemplate 
dramatic innovations that would catch large numbers of officials unawares.  
The Supreme Court once addressed this problem through non-retroactivity 
  With the prospect that qualified immunity 
might reduce the number of occasions when courts will address arguments 
seeking an expansion of constitutional rights, the doctrine’s overall effect in 
facilitating legal change grows uncertain. 
 
  121.  See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 97–105. 
  122.  533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
  123.  Id. at 200–01. 
  124.  555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
  125.  Id. at 236. 
  126.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 
SUP.  CT.  REV.  115, 117 (“Going directly to qualified immunity will . . . inhibit the 
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doctrines that applied only in cases where judicial rulings constituted a 
sharp break with prior law.127  The Court could do so again.128  Over the 
past several decades, it has frowned on doctrines that expressly hold 
judicial determinations of rights not to be retroactively applicable to cases 
on direct review.129  In its view, failure to apply a rule articulated in one 
case to other cases still pending on direct review unfairly treats similarly 
situated litigants unequally130 and “violates basic norms of constitutional 
adjudication.”131  For reasons I have given elsewhere, I do not find the 
Court’s stated reasoning wholly convincing.132
D.  Facilitating Early Dismissal of Frivolous Suits 
  Without rehearsing those 
reasons, I would make just one point here:  as the Equilibration Thesis 
emphasizes, official immunity is not the only possible mechanism for 
promoting some or all of the goals that immunity currently serves, 
including avoiding chill with respect to changes of law. 
In  Harlow, the Supreme Court emphasized the function of official 
immunity in facilitating the dismissal of frivolous suits prior to trial.133
 
  127.  See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1738–44. 
  In 
considering this justification for official immunity, it is important to be 
precise about the senses in which immunity doctrines might successfully 
target frivolous suits.  As a conceptual matter, the only effect that every 
immunity doctrine has, simply by virtue of being an immunity doctrine, is 
to shift the substantive standard that differentiates frivolous from non-
frivolous litigation.  For example, absolute judicial immunity makes 
frivolous every suit against a judge arising from the exercise of a judicial 
function.  Qualified immunity makes suits frivolous when they do not 
allege violations of clearly established rights.  But immunity rules do not 
  128.  See, e.g., David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:  
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 79 
(1989) (proposing this approach). 
  129.  See, e.g.,  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (holding that “the 
integrity of judicial review requires” full retroactive application of new rules in criminal 
cases “to all similar cases pending on direct review”); see also Harper v. Va.  Dep’t of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (adopting a similar approach to civil cases). 
  130.  See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97. 
  131.  Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. 
  132.  See  Fallon &  Meltzer,  supra  note  10, at 1764–67, 1807–11 (arguing that most 
retroactivity and non-retroactivity questions are best analyzed as arising within the law of 
remedies and that the law of remedies does not invariably require a remedy for every rights 
violation, especially when there are compelling practical reasons to withhold remedies). 
  133.  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (stating that “public policy . . . 
mandates an application of the qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat of 
insubstantial claims without resort to trial”); id. at 819 n.35 (reiterating prior admonitions 
that “‘insubstantial’ suits against high public officials should not be allowed to proceed to 
trial”);  see also  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (characterizing qualified 
immunity as “an immunity from suit” that is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial”); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases:  The 
Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 661 (1989) (observing that “Harlow’s decision 
to revise the qualified immunity standard by deleting the subjective prong of the defense 
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necessarily succeed in excluding suits that are frivolous in a deeper, non-
tautological sense.  For instance, plaintiffs can frequently avoid the 
immunity bar by pleading plausible-sounding constitutional violations that 
they almost certainly could not prove.  There is a second sense, however, in 
which immunity doctrines might be thought to target frivolous litigation 
and to do so relatively successfully.  Official immunity might facilitate 
dismissal of suits in which good reason exists to think that no actual 
constitutional violation has occurred or that plaintiffs could not prove the 
facts on which their claims depend.  For example, one might think that suits 
against judges or prosecutors are especially likely to be frivolous based on 
psychological predictions that disgruntled litigants will frequently allege 
constitutional violations when none has in fact occurred.134
If we assume that immunity doctrines aim to weed out frivolous suits in 
this second sense, they almost surely have some effect in doing so, but it is 
obvious, too, that they are at best crudely fitted to that purpose.  It is 
therefore worth asking whether better mechanisms might exist.  This 
question has current resonance because the Supreme Court appears recently 
to have adopted a different, albeit complementary rather than alternative, 
doctrinal innovation aimed at securing dismissal of frivolous suits prior to 
trial.  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
  One might also 
speculate that claims resting on allegations of subjective bad faith are likely 
to be frivolous because incapable of proof. 
135 the Court held, by a 5-4 vote, that district 
courts should dismiss complaints that assert conclusory or factually 
implausible claims to relief.136  In my view, the Iqbal standard contravenes 
the plain directive of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.137  It 
also licenses discretionary judicial decision making that could seriously 
disadvantage plaintiffs asserting unpopular claims.138
 
  134.  See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (“The loser in one forum will 
frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus.”); 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976) (reasoning that in the absence of immunity, 
suits against prosecutors “could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will 
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious 
actions to the State’s advocate”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (observing that a 
judge’s “errors may be corrected on appeal” and that “he should not have to fear that 
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”). 
  Iqbal does, however, 
illustrate the possibility of employing other,  potentially better adapted 
  135.  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
  136.  Id. at 1949–50. 
  137.  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:  A Double Play on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 86 (2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal have 
redefined Rule 8(a)(2).”); see also  id.  at 10 (stating that Twombly  and  Iqbal  continue a 
“retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and 
equality of litigant treatment”). 
  138.  See, e.g.,  id.,  at 83 (“By leaving the notions of abusive discovery and meritless 
litigation undefined in Twombly and Iqbal while simultaneously encouraging judges to factor 
concerns about them into their Rule 12(b)(6) decisions, the Court has authorized judges to let 
their own views and attitudes regarding these phenomena influence their decisionmaking.  
This virtually unbridled discretion is inappropriate.  It compounds the subjectivity inherent 
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mechanisms to deal with social costs of frivolous litigation that the Court 
has more typically tried to address through official immunity doctrines. 
E.  Eliminating Costly Litigation when Other Remedies Are Adequate 
Absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity, in particular, are often 
justified on the ground that other corrective devices internal to the judicial 
process make suits for damages against judges and prosecutors unnecessary 
as a mechanism for vindicating constitutional rights.139  When coupled with 
the argument that judges and prosecutors would be especially likely to 
attract suits from disgruntled parties, notably including criminal 
defendants,140
F.  Simultaneously Promoting a Multitude of Goals 
  this argument has long prevailed—and deservedly so, I 
would opine.  Against the backdrop of the analysis that I have offered 
previously, I would add just  one further word of caution:  even if the 
conventional justifications for official immunity doctrines seem persuasive 
with respect to one segment of immunity law, we should not complacently 
assume that the conventional wisdom is more pervasively correct. 
A final possible aim of official immunity is avowedly multi-faceted:  
although not perfectly suited to achieving any of the individual goals that I 
have discussed so far, immunity might provide a  uniquely  elegant, 
judicially manageable, and comprehensible means of simultaneously 
promoting a weighted mix of all those aims.  On this view, trans-
substantivity is more a virtue than a vice.  It minimizes doctrinal complexity 
while serving a number of functions reasonably well, even if none 
optimally. 
Of all possible accounts of what official immunity might be good for, this 
one poses the hardest challenge of evaluation.  Admittedly, any full 
assessment would need to consider a potentially long series of possible 
bundles of doctrinal reforms, not one-for-one substitutions of one rule for 
another.  But the suggestion that immunity doctrine might be desirable 
overall, even if it performs all of its individual functions relatively crudely, 
is merely a suggestion, not a conclusion that anyone, so far as I know, has 
attempted to establish by careful argument. 
Moreover, in the absence of careful argument, skepticism about the 
optimality of the status quo seems very much in order.  The central, 
incentive-based and fairness-based defenses of official immunity both 
depend on the assumption that it, and it alone, shields individual officers 
from the prospect of potentially devastating personal liability for acts 
committed in their personal capacities.  As noted above, however,  that 
premise is at best uncertain and is quite likely mistaken.  Without more 
empirical knowledge about practices of indemnification, and the incentives 
 
  139.  See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–29 (noting the availability of alternative remedial 
mechanisms for prosecutorial misconduct); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (noting that appellate 
review can correct a judge’s errors without exposing the judge to civil liability). 
  140.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 506  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 80 
that they create, we cannot be confident that the main elements of the 
existing doctrinal structure do not rest on fallacies.  And it seems unlikely, 
even though it is not impossible, that doctrines erected on mistaken 
premises would turn out by happy accident to be the best possible response 
to a diverse amalgam of goals. 
G.  Partial Summary and Agenda 
My inquiry in this part into whether official immunity is well designed to 
achieve its intended purposes has generated as many questions as answers.  
Although immunity is not obviously maladapted to its asserted aims, it is 
not obviously optimal in all respects either.  In considering possible 
avenues of doctrinal reform, we should ask two kinds of questions that the 
scholarly literature to date—albeit with some glorious exceptions141
CONCLUSION:  AN AGENDA FOR COURTS AND SCHOLARS 
—has 
addressed too infrequently.  Some are empirical;  we should more 
searchingly examine a number of the factual assumptions on which leading 
arguments purporting to justify official immunity currently rest.  Other 
questions that cry out for attention are comparative.  Viewing official 
immunity doctrine as one potential mechanism of doctrinal equilibration 
among others, we should think more imaginatively about possible 
alternatives. 
In this Essay, I have sought to situate questions about official immunity 
in the context of broader issues of constitutional implementation.  The 
Equilibration Thesis that I have advanced here reveals immunity as a 
variable among other variables, not a variable among constants.  The 
Equilibration Thesis depicts rights, causes of action, and surrounding 
implementing mechanisms as a package.  It further frames the question of 
how individual elements of the package might best be calibrated to achieve 
the most desirable overall alignment. 
In light of the Equilibration Thesis, official immunity is by no means 
necessarily the inherently regrettable outcome of a balance of evils that the 
conventional wisdom has long assumed it to be.  With immunity, we may 
have a better scheme of substantive constitutional rights than we would 
have without immunity.  Without immunity, the social costs of defining 
rights broadly would be greater, and we might well have fewer recognized 
rights than we have now.  But if the purpose of immunity doctrines is, or 
ought to be, to promote achievement of the best overall bundle of 
recognized substantive rights, causes of action, and other implementing and 
limiting doctrines, a leading question needing to be asked involves the 
functions, if any, that official immunity doctrines are better adapted to serve 
than other doctrines would be.  Besides highlighting that question, I have 
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suggested some alternative mechanisms for achieving immunity’s 
ostensible purposes and have emphasized that the Supreme Court and other 
policy makers would be better situated to make good decisions if they had 
better empirical information. 
Critics of official immunity who confine themselves to narrowly textual, 
historical, and precedential analysis risk missing vitally important questions 
of constitutional implementation that immunity doctrines inescapably 
implicate.  By identifying kinds of comparative analysis and types of 
information that more sophisticated thinking about official immunity would 
require, I have sought in this Essay to mark lines of inquiry not just for 
judges and justices, but also for scholars.   